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THE REJECTION OR MODIFICATION OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 1113
INTRODUCTION
On September 24, 1983, Continental Airlines, the nation's eighth largest
air passenger carrier, filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Texas a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 [Codel.' Continental then unilaterally changed work rules
and slashed salaries in violation of collective bargaining agreements in effect
with the several unions representing Continental employees.' Three days later
the airline resumed operations on roughly one-third of its former system, using
employees willing to cross picket lines set up by two unions opposed to the
company's actions.' These employees found themselves working under fun-
damentally different conditions. Pilots formerly earning an average of $77,000
a year now earned a flat $43,000, while flight attendants went from a pre-
Chapter 11 filing average of $29,000 to a new base of $14,000."
The Continental case, while furnishing a dramatic example of the use of
bankruptcy laws to escape obligations under collective bargaining agreements,
was by no means an extraordinary occurrence. Petitions filed by businesses for
relief under Chapter 11 totaled 18,306 for the year ending on June 30, 1983,
compared to 12,385 and 7,230 for 1982 and 1981, respectively.' In many in-
stances, these petitions were filed by companies hit hard either by the effects of
the recent recession or by governmental deregulatory efforts, especially in the
trucking, airline, steel, and heavy manufacturing industries.6 Frequently, such
companies were contractually required to pay high wages and benefits to
unionized employees under collective bargaining agreements. Businesses in
Chapter 11 often cited these costs as an impediment to successful reorganiza-
tion,7 while union members argued that such claims constituted little more
than legalized unionbusting!
The controversy intensified after the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v.
Bildisco and Bildisco.9 The decision outraged union leaders and led to the
'II U.S.C. § 101-151326 (1982).
'MONTHLY LAB. REV. 73 (November 1983).
'Id.
1Id.
'AD. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS ANN. REP. 420 (1983), 400 (1982), Annual Report of the Director of the Ad-
ministrative Office of 552 (1981).
'See, e.g., Shopman's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975); In re
Briggs Transp. Co., 39 Bankr. 343 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); In re Bloss Glass Co., Inc., 39 Bankr. 694 (Bankr.
M.D. Pa. 1984); In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 25 Bankr. 216 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
'See, e.g., In re Bloss Glass Co., Inc., 39 Bankr. 694 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1984).
SBrowning, Using Bankruptcy to Reject Labor Contracts, 70 A.B.A. J. 60 (Feb. 1984).
'104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
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passage of 11 U.S.C. § 1113. This comment will explore the issues arising from
efforts by businesses to reject or modify collective bargaining agreements
under section 1113. The comment will review the history of such efforts, and
will then discuss the Bildisco decision. The comment will then examine section
1113 and offer suggestions as to its interpretation.
BACKGROUND
Under Chapter 11 of the Code, a financially distressed corporation is
given an opportunity to reorganize. Such a reorganization contemplates a
restructuring of the entity's finances in order to preserve the continued ex-
istence of the business as well as to preserve its employees' jobs. 0 Section
365(a)" furthers this goal by allowing a debtor-in-possession, 2 subject to the
court's approval, to assume or reject any executory contract. This power to re-
ject any executory contract is well established in bankruptcy law 3 and is based
on the principle that a trustee in bankruptcy might renounce title to and aban-
don burdensome property.'
Although the Bankruptcy Code contains no definition of the term execu-
tory contract, 5 it has long been interpreted to include collective bargaining
agreements. In NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco, the Supreme Court agreed
with this interpretation. The Court noted that section 365(a) contains limita-
tions on the debtor-in-possession's power to reject executory contracts, yet
none of these limitations apply to collective bargaining agreements. 7 In addi-
tion, section 1167 of the Bankruptcy Code expressly exempts executory con-
tracts subject to the Railway Labor Act from the reach of the debtor-in-posses-
sion's rejection power. 8 Thus, the Court concluded that Congress intended
"1H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD. NEWS 5963, 6179.
"Section 365(a) provides: "Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c),
and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory con-
tract or unexpired lease of the debtor." Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, §365(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
"For the purposes of this comment the term debtor-in-possession will include both a trustee and a debtor-in-
possession since under the Code, with a few variations, a debtor-in-possession has essentially the same rights
as a trustee. See II U.S.C. §1107.
"The power to reject executory contracts was first codified in the Chandler Bankruptcy Act of 1938, but had
previously been well established by judicial decision. 4a COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY §70.43(l) (15th ed. 1984).
1'2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY §365.01(1) (15th ed. 1984).
"Professor Countryman has defined an executory contract as follows: "[a] contract under which the obliga-
tion of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that failure of either to
complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other." Coun-
tryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973). This definition was
followed in New England Carpet Co. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 18 Bankr. 514, 516 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1982); In re Sun Ray Bakery, Inc., 5 Bankr. 670, 672 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980).
162 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY supra note 14, at § 365.03.
'1104 S. Ct. at 1194.
"Id. at 1194-95, 1995 n. 8. Section 1167(a) provides "Notwithstanding section 365 of this title, neither the
court nor the trustee may change the wages or working conditions of employees of the debtor established by
a collective-bargaining agreement that is subject to the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. §§151 et seq.) except
in accordance with section 6 of such act (45 U.S.C. § 156)." II U.S.C. § 103(g) limits this section to cases con-
2
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that under section 365(a) executory contracts include collective bargaining
agreements.
This interpretation, however, places federal bankruptcy law squarely at
odds with federal labor law. One of the basic policies of labor law is to en-
courage the creation and enforcement of collective bargaining procedures.' 9
Accordingly, the National Labor Relations Act [NLRA]P0 and the Railway
Labor Act [RLA]2' specify the procedures that an employer must observe when
modifying or rejecting a collective bargaining agreement.2 These procedures
and the policies underlying them23 are evaded when an employer is permitted
to reject a collective bargaining agreement under the Bankruptcy Code.
Ordinarily, executory contracts subject to section 365(a) can be rejected
by the debtor-in-possession on the basis of a simple business judgment stan-
dard.2" Under this test, the court will permit rejection of an executory contract
when rejection is advantageous to the debtor.2 This test, however, has only
been applied to collective bargaining agreements in two reported cases.2" In-
stead, courts have applied a stricter standard, recognizing the favored status of
collective bargaining agreements and the employee rights and federal labor
policies affected by such decisions. 7
cerning a railroad. This narrow construction of § 1167 has been followed by the courts. See, e.g., In re
Braniff Airways, Inc., 25 Bankr. 216 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) ("the restriction on the right to affect collec-
tive bargaining agreements applies only to employees of debtor railroads."). Id. at 217.
"See Comment, Collective Bargaining and Bankruptcy, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 477 (1969); Note, The Accom-
modation of the Bankruptcy and Labor Acts in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859,
860-61 (1983).
-29 U.S.C. §§151-69 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2145 U.S.C. §§151-88 (1976 & Supp. LV 1980).
2National Labor Relations Act §8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976 & Supp. V. 1981). Section 8(d) requires a par-
ty seeking to modify or terminate a collective bargaining agreement to:
I) serve written notice of such a change to the other party sixty days before the termination of the con-
tract,
2) offer to meet and confer with the other party to negotiate any changes or a new contract,
3) notify federal and/or state mediation agency within thirty days of termination if no agreement is reached,
4) recognize the existing contract as in effect until sixty days has expired of the contract has terminated.
Railway Labor Act §6, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 2 of the RLA provides that terms
of a collective bargaining agreement can only be modified in accordance with section 6 of the RLA. 45
U.S.C. §152 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 6 obligates a carrier to use a protracted procedure in attempting
to change an agreement and requires adherence to the contractual status quo during the negotiations. 45
U.S.C. §156 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
3"The [provisions] of §8(d) ... are specifically designed to prevent labor strife resulting from unilateral modi-
fications and terminations of collective-bargaining agreements." 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1208 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
242 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 14, at §365.03.
24d.
1TMhe two cases are In re Klaber Brothers, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. N.Y. 1959) and Local Joint Executive
Board, AFL-CIO v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. Cal. 1976), affid, 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980).
'See John Wiley & Sons, Inc., v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,550 (1964) ("A collective bargaining agreement is
not an ordinary contract .... [Ilt is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsman can-
not wholly anticipate...").
COMMENTSSpring, 19851
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Appellate courts developed several versions of this stricter standard before
the Supreme Court reached this issue in Bildisco. 28 The stricter standard was
first articulated in Shopman's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products,
Inc. 29 After rejecting the business judgment test, the court held that rejection
of a collective bargaining agreement should be permitted "only after thorough
scrutiny, and a careful balancing of the equities on both sides....
The next important appellate case was Brotherhood of Railway, Airline &
Steamship Clerks v. REA Express.,3 decided by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals only a few weeks after its decision in Kevin Steel. Here, the court es-
tablished a standard governing rejection different from that set out in Kevin
Steel. Under this approach, rejection would be permitted only "after a careful
weighing of all the factors and equities involved" establishes that unless the
agreement is rejected the debtor will be forced into liquidation. 2 While not
purporting to develop a new standard, the REA court clearly placed a greater
burden on the debtor-in-possession seeking rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement. Only by establishing that the business would collapse should the
petition for rejection be denied would a debtor be permitted to reject the agree-
ment.
BILDISCO
The next important appellate decision was In re Bildisco,3  the first ap-
pellate case following the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act.4 Bildisco
and Bildisco, a New Jersey general partnership in the business of distributing
building supplies, had filed for reorganization under Chapter II and had been
authorized to operate as a debtor-in-possession.35 Bildisco's petition to reject a
collective bargaining agreement with a union representing forty to forty-five
percent of its employees was granted by the bankruptcy court.' The union
meanwhile filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Rela-
2For a more comprehensive review of these standards see Comment, The Rejection ofCollective Bargaining
Agreements within Bankruptcy Reorganization: Reconciling a Legislative Dilemma, 17 AKRON L. REv. 761(1984); Note, The Collective Bargaining Agreement in Bankruptcy: Rejection and Its Consequences, 36ARK. L. REv. 469 (1983); Note, The Accommodation of the Bankruptcy and Labor Acts in Chapter 11
Reorganizations, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 859 (1983).
11519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
I'M at 707.
11523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 96 S. Ct. 451 (1975), 96 S. Ct. 855 (1976). As with Kevin Steel,
REA Express was decided under section 313 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Cases construing section 365
rely on court interpretation of section 313. See, e.g.. In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982).
u523 F.2d at 169.
-682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982).
-"]Me Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§1-1330 (Supp. IV 1980), replaced the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, 11 U.S.C. §§1-1220 (1976).
"682 F.2d at 75.
"ia
[Vol. 18:4
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Spring, 19851
tions Board.3" The Board found that Bildisco had violated section §§ 8(a)(5) and
8(a)(l) of the NLRA3  by unilaterally changing the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement and by refusing to negotiate with the union. The Board
then ordered Bildisco to observe the terms of the agreement?9
On appeal to the Third Circuit, the NLRB's petition to enforce its order
and the union's appeal were consolidated. After holding that collective
bargaining agreements were subject to rejection under section 365(a) of the
Code,' the court adopted the standard employed by the Second Circuit in
Kevin Steel. The Bildisco court held that this required the debtor-in-possession
to show not only that the collective bargaining agreement is "burdensome to
the estate," but also that the equities balance in favor of rejection.4'
The Third Circuit also refused to enforce the order of the NLRB, which
rested on the finding of an unfair labor practice. The court characterized the
debtor-in-possession as a new entity which was not bound by its prior collective
bargaining agreement. Because it was no longer a party to this agreement,
Bildisco as debtor-in-possession had the ability to reject the agreement without
following the procedures set out in section 8(d) of the NLRA.42 The "new enti-
ty" theory therefore removed the basis for the unfair labor practice charges
brought by the NLRB.43
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court sought to resolve the
conflict between the test adopted by the Third Circuit in Bildisco and the
stricter standard established by the Second Circuit in REA Express." The
Court also reached the issue of whether an employer who fails to abide by the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement before the court permits rejection of
the agreement commits an unfair labor practice.
As to the applicable standard, the Court refused to adopt the strict REA
Express test. According to the Court, this standard is "fundamentally at odds
with the policies of flexibility and equity" underlying Chapter 11 and will "pre-
sent difficulties to the debtor-in-possession that will interfere with the
reorganization process."'3 Instead the Court, citing In re Brada-Miller Freight
"I1d
"Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §158, provides in part: (a) Unfair labor prac-
tices by employer: It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title; ... (5) to refuse to bargain col-
lectively with the representatives of his employees....
"'682 F.2d at 76.
4l1 at 78.
Oldk at 81.
41d at 82-83.
'ld at 83.
*104 S. Ct. 1188, 1191-92.
Old at 1196.
COMMENTS
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System, Inc., 6 adopted the test employed by the Second Circuit below. Thus,
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement under section 365(a) should only
be permitted "if the debtor can show that the agreement burdens the estate,
and ... after careful scrutiny, the equities balance in favor of' rejection.47
The Court supplied the bankruptcy courts with several guidelines to help
implement this standard. A balancing of the equities must not occur unless the
court is "persuaded that reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modifica-
tion have been made and are not likely to produce a prompt and satisfactory
solution."'"4 In addition, rejection should not be permitted without a finding in
the record that such action would serve the policy of Chapter 11 to permit the
successful rehabilitation of the debtor. ' Thus, when balancing the equities the
bankruptcy court's overriding focus must concern the policy goals behind
Chapter 11.
The Court split on the second issue, holding that a debtor-in-possession
does not commit an unfair labor practice by failing to comply with the labor
laws before the court permits rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement.5 0 The Court, however, did not rely on the "new entity" theory
employed by the Third Circuit below. This theory had been widely criticized
for its analytical inconsistencies.5
Instead, the Court characterized the debtor-in-possession as the same enti-
ty now empowered by the Bankruptcy Code to deal with its contracts in a dif-
ferent manner. The Code's primary purpose is to provide the debtor-in-
possession with some flexibility and breathing space in moving toward a suc-
cessful reorganization. Saddling the debtor-in-possession with unfair labor
practice charges for failing to abide by the agreement pending judicial action
on the petition would, in effect, enforce the contract terms of the agreement.
This, the Court felt, runs counter to the idea of flexibility provided by Chapter
11 and thus unfair labor practice charges will not lie in this situation. 2
16702 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1983).
1104 S. Ct. at 1196.
"Id.
"Id. at 1197.
Determining what would constitute a successful rehabilitation involves balancing the interests of the
affected parties - the debtor, creditors, and employees. The Bankruptcy Court must consider the
likelihood and consequences of liquidation for the debtor absent rejection, the reduced value of the
creditor's claims that would follow from affirmance and the hardship that would impose on them, and
the impact of rejection on the employees. Id.
4Id. at 1199.
"See, e.g., Bordewieck & Countryman, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11
Debtors, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293, 301 (1983) "The 'new entity' theory simply cannot withstand close
scrutiny; one need only observe that a 'new entity', not a party to the contracts of its prepetition predecessor,
would scarcely need bankruptcy court approval to reject one of these contracts." Id. at 301. See also In re
Brada Miller Freight System, Inc., 702 F.2d 890, 895 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
52104 S. Ct. at 1198-99.
[Vol. 18:4
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Four justices dissented on this second holding. Justice Brennan argued
that an accommodation between the bankruptcy and labor laws must focus on
the policies behind both statutes and not solely on the bankruptcy laws. Refus-
ing to recognize unilateral termination as an unfair labor practice would not
serve section 8(d)'s policy of regulating terminations so as to facilitate agree-
ment and to discourage economic warfare. 3 In addition, Chapter I l's policy to
promote successful reorganization is still served if the court permits rejection
of the agreement.
THE REACTION TO BILDISCO
Organized labor reacted immediately to the Bildisco decision. Lane Kirk-
land, president of the AFL-CIO, expressed his disappointment in the decision
and vowed to pursue a legislative remedy.5 ' Within two months the AFL-CIO
had sent more than 20,000 letters and postcards to Capitol Hill expressing con-
cern about the case." Other unions, including the Teamsters and the Air Line
Pilots Association, began lobbying for some type of congressional response. 6
The reasons for the unions' concern were apparent. In light of the Bildisco
decision and the actions taken by Continental Airlines,57 unions feared that
Chapter I 1 now provided management with a method of escaping labor con-
tracts while ignoring the safeguards built into the labor laws. Alternatively, the
unions feared that Chapter 11 would at least provide management with a "big
stick" with which to win concessions from the unions. This was particularly
alarming to the unions because there is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code to pre-
vent an otherwise solvent company from filing under Chapter 1 1.15 The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 deleted the insolvancy requirement found in
the 1898 Act in favor of speed and simplicity in reorganizing the debtor.59
SECTION 1113
Congress responded within three months. As part of the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Congress added a new sec-
tion 1113 to Chapter 1 1.60 Section 1113 sets out the procedure under which a
debtor-in-possession in Chapter 1 may reject or modify a collective bargaining
3Id. at 1208. (Brennan, J., dissenting.)
'N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1984, at D25, col. 4.
"Wall St. J., May 15, 1984, at I, col. 5.
"Taylor, Congress Fails to Change Laws on Bankruptcy, Wall St. J., April 2, 1984, at 4, col. I.
"See text accompanying notes 1-4.
"Browning, Using Bankruptcy to Reject Labor Contracts, 70 A.B.A. J. 60, 61 (Feb. 1981).
59d.
- I I U.S.C. § 1113. For a history of the adoption of section 1113, see Rosenberg, Bankruptcy and the Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement - A Brief Lesson in the Use of the Constitutional System of Checks and
Balances, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293 (1984).
COMMENTSSpring, 19851
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agreement." The section substantially adopts the standard for rejection
developed by the Supreme Court in Bildisco while overruling the Court's
holding concerning unilateral rejection and unfair labor practice charges.
Under Section 1113 the court can approve an application for rejection of
a collective bargaining agreement only if the following requirements are met:
(1) The debtor-in-possession has proposed necessary modifications to the agree-
ment that are fair and equitable to all parties; (2) The union rejects the pro-
posal without good cause; and, (3) The balance of the equities clearly favors re-
jection of the agreement.
Proposal to Modify the Agreement
In general, Section 1113 requires negotiations to attempt to save both the
collective bargaining agreement and the business prior to court adjudication of
an application to reject the agreement. 63 Thus, subsection (b)(1)(A) requires the
debtor-in-possession to make a proposal to the union before filing such an ap-
plication.' The proposal must provide for "those necessary modifications [in
the agreement] that are necessary to permit reorganization of the debtor, and
[to] assure[ I that all creditors, the debtor, and all affected parties are treated
fairly and equitably....
According to the legislative history, the key phrase is "necessary modifica-
tions," meaning only those modifications that must be accomplished if the
reorganization is to succeed. 66 By imposing this limitation, Congress sought to
prevent a debtor-in-possession from using Chapter 11 to "rid itself of unwanted
features of the labor agreement that have no relation to its financial condition
and its reorganization. 67
In In re American Provision Co.," the bankruptcy court considered an ap-
plication to reject two collective bargaining agreements under section 1113.
The court held that the debtor-in-possession bears the burden of persuasion by
"Section 1113 does not apply to a case covered by subchapter IV of Chapter II and by title I of the RLA. I I
U.S.C. § 103(g) limits subchapter IV to cases concerning a railroad. Thus, section 1113 will not apply to cases
concerning the reorganization of debtor railroads.
6211 U.S.C. §1113(c).
"1130 CONG. REC. S8891 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
"Subsection (b)(I)(a) provides: Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seeking rejec-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor in possession or trustee ... shall -
(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees covered by such agreement,
based on the most complete and reliable information available at the time of such proposal, which
provides for those necessary modifications in the employees benefits and protections that are
necessary to permit the reorganizations of the debtor and assures that all creditors, the debtor and all
of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably....
65d.
"130 CONG. REC.. supra note 63, at H7496 (statement of Rep. Morrison).
67d. at S8898 (statement of Sen. Packwood).
"44 Bankr. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). (Memorandum order).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:4
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 18 [1985], Iss. 4, Art. 9
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol18/iss4/9
the preponderance of the evidence of showing that the proposed modifications
are necessary to permit successful reorganization. 9 Here, the debtor-in-
possession failed to meet its burden because the proposed modifications would
have produced savings amounting to only two percent of the debtor's monthly
operating expenses.70 Thus, under subsection (b)(l)(A) the debtor-in-possession
must be able to justify its proposed modifications since courts will strike down
any proposals that are not necessary to permit successful reorganization.
Under subsection (b)(1)(A), the proposal must also assure that "all
creditors, the debtor, and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and
equitably . . .'"I This requirement assures that the burden of sacrifices in the
reorganization process does not fall exclusively on the unionized employees
but is spread among all affected parties."
Wage reduction is one such burden. The pre-section 1113 cases may offer
some guidance in this area. The In re Blue Ribbon Transportation Co., Inc. "
court granted the debtor-in-possession's petition to reject a collective bargain-
ing agreement but only on the condition that the company reduce its manage-
ment costs. The court noted that unionized workers had agreed to significant
concessions before the company filed under Chapter 1 1,' while management
expenses remained far above the industry average." The court therefore
ordered the company to reduce management salaries, cut the number of com-
pany cars, eliminate gas credit cards, and reduce management welfare and pen-
sion plan payments before the agreement could be rejected. 6 Thus, in keeping
with this rationale, the union can argue that under subsection (b)(1)(A) any
proposed reductions in union wages and benefits must be accompanied by cor-
responding reductions among management and non-union employees. The
debtor-in-possession may again bear the burden of showing that the proposed
modifications treat all parties fairly and equitably."
Under subsection (b)(1)(B), the debtor-in-possession must provide the
union with "such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the
proposal."78 Under subsection (b)(1)(A), the proposal itself must be based on the
"most complete and reliable information available at the time of such
"Id. at 909.
*ld. at 910.
I I U.S.C. §11 13(b)(l)(A).
"130 CONG. REC.. supra note 63, at S8898 (statement of Sen. Packwood).
1130 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1983).
11ld. at 784.
"1d. at 786-87.
11d. at 788.
"44 Bankr. at 909.
-11 U.S.C. § I II3(b)(l)(B).
Spring, 1985] COMMENTS
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proposal."79 Therefore, relevant information would include such current com-
plete and reliable information.
The legislative history emphasizes the mandatory character of this provi-
sion by stating that if the debtor-in-possession does not meet or delays his obli-
gation to provide this information the petition to reject the agreement should
be denied." In In re American Provision Co., the court held that the debtor
must show what information it provided to the union.8' The union then bears
the burden of production to show that the "information provided was not the
relevant information which was necessary for it to evaluate the proposal."'"
Thus, if the union meets this burden, then the petition should be denied.
There are limits on the reach of this subsection. Under subsection (d)(3),
the court may enter protective orders, consistent with the union's needs to
evaluate the proposal, which may be necessary to prevent disclosures which
could harm the debtor-in-possession's competitive standing. 3 The legislative
history also insists that the proposal is not to be construed to require a detailed
accounting of how the difficult burden of reorganization is to be distributed
amongst the competing parties.8"
Good Faith
After making the proposal the debtor-in-possession is obligated under sub-
section (b)(2) to meet at reasonable times with the union to confer in good faith
concerning a modification of the agreement. 5 This subsection does not explain
what is good faith. However, the legislative history indicates that the concept
should be interpreted according to the Bildisco decision.' 6 In Bildisco, the
Court held that in reviewing the negotiation process, the bankruptcy court
"need not determine that the parties have bargained to impasse or make any
other determination outside the field of its expertise."' 7 Thus, it appears that
the bankruptcy court should interpret the good faith requirement according to
the needs of the situation, rather than according to established labor law con-
I I U.S.C. § I I 13(b)(I)(A).
3130 CONG. REC., supra note 63, at H7496 (statement of Rep. Morrison).
i44 Bankr. at 909.
'lid. at 910.
3Subsection (d)(3) provides:
The court may enter such protective orders, consistent with the need of the authorized representative
of the employee to evaluate the trustee's proposal and the application for rejection, as may be neces-
sary to prevent disclosure of information provided to such representative where such disclosure could
compromise the position of the debtor with respect to competitors in the industry in which it is en-
gaged.
s'130 CONG. REC., supra note 63, at S8892 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
8511 U.S.C. § I I 13(b)(2).
"130 CONG. REC., supra note 63, at S8891 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
17104 S. Ct. at 1197.
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cepts.88
In In re American Provision Co., the debtor-in-possession held a single
meeting with the union to discuss modifications of the collective bargaining
agreement. The debtor ignored union requests for further discussion. The
union declined to accept the proposed modifications. In rejecting the petition
to repudiate the agreement, the court held that the union met its burden of pro-
ducing evidence that the debtor-in-possession did not confer in good faith and
that the debtor-in-possession did not meet its burden of proving that it had. 9
This result demonstrates the emphasis which Congress placed on negotiation
through the use of the good faith requirement.
Good Cause
The second requirement that must be met before rejection of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement is permitted is that the union must have rejected the
debtor-in-possession's proposal without good cause.9 Here the key phrase is
"good cause." The legislative history indicates that "good cause" does not im-
part traditional labor law concepts to a bankruptcy forum, nor does it
transform the bankruptcy court into a version of the NLRB.9' Rather, the
phrase is to be interpreted narrowly,9 intending to ensure that a continuing
process of good faith negotiation will take place before court involvement. 93
Thus, the requirement of "good cause" in subsection (c) puts pressure on the
debtor-in-possession to negotiate in good faith in order to make it more dif-
ficult for the union to have good cause to reject the proposal.
The legislative history also states that "good cause" is intended to embody
the standard set out by Professor Countryman in a recent article.9 In his arti-
cle, Countryman argues that considerable weight should be given to a "con-
sidered union view" that rejection of the agreement is not necessary." The
reasoning behind this position is apparent. A debtor-in-possession arguing that
rejection of the agreement is necessary or the business will fail has little to lose
if this is an incorrect position and he should prevail. In such a situation, the
debtor-in-possession will have avoided the agreement when it was not
necessary to do so in order to save the business. A union arguing that rejection
is not necessary to save the business, however, has a great deal to lose if this is
"See Gibson, The New Law on Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Chapter II: An Analysis
of 11 U.S.C. § 1113, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 329-30 (1984).
044 Bankr. at 911.
III U.S.C. § i11 3(c)(2).
9"130 CONG. REC., supra note 63, at S8887 (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
Wld. at H7495 (statement of Rep. Lungren).
"Id. at H7496 (statement of Rep. Morrison).
"Id., citing Bordewieck & Countryman, supra note 5 I, at 299, 309.
"Bordewick & Countryman, supra note 51, at 299-300, 319.
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an incorrect position and the union prevails." In that case, the collective
bargaining agreement remains intact, the business fails, and the unionized
employees lose their jobs.
Another commentator has offered an alternative interpretation of "good
cause."97 Under this interpretation, the union would have good cause to reject
a debtor-in-possession's proposal when the union submits a counterproposal
that also meets the requirements of section 11 1 3(b)(2).91 Such an interpretation
is consistent with the purpose of section 1113 of placing the overall emphasis
on the negotiation process and not on the courts.99
Both interpretations recognize that the union could be placed in a difficult
position under subsection (c)(2). In a Chapter 1 1 case there may be numerous
proposals that will satisfy subsection (b)(l)(A)."'0 Yet the union will inevitably
prefer one alternative over the others. Thus, "good cause" should not be con-
strued to deprive a union negotiating in good faith of the ability to bargain be-
tween the available alternatives. The court should therefore construe "good
cause" liberally. This will encourage the parties to negotiate, and will prevent
the union from being forced to accept the debtor-in-possession's proposal,
which may be only one of several feasible alternatives.
Balance of the Equities
The last requirement under the section 1113 standard for rejection is that
"the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement." This
differs slightly from the Bildisco standard since the balance must clearly favor
rejection of the agreement. This was intended to assure that rejection is not
warranted where the equities balance exactly equally on both sides.'0' In addi-
tion, this requirement may also prevent a court from applying merely the
business judgment test under the guise of a balancing of the equities standard.
In Bildisco, the Supreme Court held that "the Bankruptcy Code does not
authorize free-wheeling consideration of every conceivable equity, but rather
only how the equities relate to the success of the reorganization."' Inter-
preting this passage before the adoption of section 1113 another court held:
[the court] must consider the possibility of liquidation, both with and
without rejection of the contract. It must also consider the import of liq-
uidation on each of the parties involved. The bankruptcy court must also
"ld. at 299-300.
"Gibson, supra note 88, at 341-42.
"Id. at 341. The proposal must contain only those modifications necessary to the reorganization and that are
fair and equitable to all parties. II U.S.C. § 1i 13(b)(2).
"Gibson, supra note 88, at 342.
'"See text accompanying notes 63-65.
191130 CONG. REc.. supra note 63, at S8891 (statement by Sen. Hatch).10104 S. Ct. at 1197.
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consider the claims of employees that will result from rejection and the
impact on claims of creditors if rejection is not allowed. The court should
also consider the possibility of a strike if rejection is approved. Another
factor is the cost-spreading abilities of the parties.' 3
This list of equities summarizes the discussion of the "balance of the
equities" test in the leading pre-section I 113 cases.1' The list is not exhaustive,
but one must remember that "'balancing the equities' is a broad, equitable test
that has not yet been given rigid form by decades of judicial interpretation.'"0 1
Thus, counsel should view this general list as a rough outline of the potential
equities involved.
Good Faith Revisited
The concept of good faith plays a dual role under section 1113. In addi-
tion to arguing that the debtor-in-possession is not negotiating in good faith,
the union can also argue that the Chapter 11 petition itself was not filed in
good faith. Such a petition will be denied."°
The proposition that a petition filed under Chapter I solely to repudiate
the collective bargaining agreement is not one filed in good faith finds support
in the pre-section 1113 cases. In In re Tinti Construction Co.,07 a unionized
contractor attempting to compete with non-union outfits sought to reject a col-
lective bargaining agreement in Chapter 11. The sole purpose of declaring
bankruptcy was to reject the agreement. The court specifically found that the
debtor-in-possession was "in no way whatsoever motivated by animus toward
the Union," and that this was not a "union busting" case.',$ Nevertheless, the
court denied the petition, holding that filing for the sole purpose of rejecting
the agreement was not a proper use of Chapter 11 .'1 Similarly, in In re Brada
Miller Freight System, Inc.," 0 the appellate court ordered the bankruptcy
court to "make an 'explicit showing in the record that the debtors were not im-
properly motivated by a desire to rid themselves of the union' prior to allowing
the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement.""'
rain re C. & W. Mining Co., 38 Bankr. 496, 502 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984).
'See NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984); In re Brada Miller Freight System, Inc., 702
F.2d 890 (11 th Cir. 1983).
'Gibson, supra note 88, at 343.
'"In the following cases, petitions filed under Chapter Ii, although unrelated to collective bargaining
agreements, were dismissed as being filed in bad faith: In re Thirtieth Place, Inc., 30 Bankr. 503 (Bankr. App.
9th Cir. 1983); In re Brandon Farmer's Market, Inc., 34 Bankr. 148 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983); In re Land-
mark Capital Co., 27 Bankr. 273 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1983); In re Avan, Inc., 25 Bankr. 121 (Bankr. D. Ohio
1982); and Weathersfield Farms, Inc. v. First Inter-State Bank, 15 Bankr. 282 (D. Ve. 1981).
"29 Bankr. 971 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1983).
mid at 974.
"id at 975.
"'702 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1983).
11id at 901.
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These cases find expression in the legislative history of section 1113. Ac-
cording to Representative Morrison, "lilt was also our understanding that a
chapter 11 reorganization case that is brought for the sole purpose of
repudiating or modifying a collective bargaining agreement is a case brought in
'bad faith'.""' 2 Thus, a union should not limit its efforts to the scope of section
1113. Instead, the union must be prepared to attack the Chapter 11 petition
itself as being filed in bad faith if it appears that the debtor-in-possession's sole
motivation is to reject or modify the collective bargaining agreement.
Timing
Under section 111 3(d)(1), the court shall hold a hearing no later than four-
teen days after the filing of an application for rejection."3 Under subsection
(d)(2), the court shall rule on the application within thirty days after com-
mencement of the hearing."' If the court does not so rule within thirty days the
debtor-in-possession may unilaterally terminate or alter any provisions of the
agreement pending a ruling by the court on the application."5 In such a situa-
tion, the debtor-in-possession would fall under Bildisco in being permitted to
unilaterally terminate the agreement before formal rejection by the Bankrupt-
cy Court.
Interim Relief
Subsection (3) allows the court to authorize the debtor-in-possession to
make interim changes in the terms of the agreement if those changes are essen-
tial to continue the debtor's business or to avoid irreparable damage to the es-
tate."6 The legislative history states that this provision essentially requires the
test used in the REA Express case; that is, a rejection or modification will be
permitted only when necessary to prevent the business from being
liquidated." 7
The cases thus far have agreed with this interpretation. In In re Wright
Air lines, Inc.,"8 the debtor-in-possession sought interim relief under subsec-
tion (e). The court interpreted subsection (e) as providing that interim relief will
112130 CONG. REC., supra note 63, at H7496 (statement of Rep. Morrison).
.1311 U.S.C. § 11 13(d)(1).
"'l1 U.S.C. § 11 13(d)(2).
1151d.
"'Subsection (e) provides:
If during a period when the collective bargaining agreement continues in effect, and if essential to the
continuation of the debtor's business, or in order to avoid irreparable damage to the estate, the court,
after notice and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to implement interim changes in the terms, con-
ditions, wages, benefits, or work rules provided by a collective bargaining agreement. Any hearing
under this paragraph shall be scheduled in accordance with the needs of the trustee. The implementa-
tion of such interim changes shall not render the application for rejection moot.
"'130 CONG. REC., supra note 63, at S8898 (statement of Sen. Packwood).
i144 Bankr. 744 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio (1984).
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be granted only if the debtor establishes either "that the relief sought is essen-
tial to the continuation of its business, or, that irreparable damage to the
Debtor-in-Possession will result if the relief is not granted."" 9 The court held
that the debtor-in-possession had not met its burden since the proposed savings
amounted to less than ten percent of its monthly losses.'
Similarly, in In re Salt Creek Freightways, 21 the court held that interim
changes may be authorized only if the evidence establishes that, without such
changes, the company will collapse and the employees will no longer have their
jobs.'22 Here the debtor-in-possession introduced evidence showing losses and
asset depletion suffered by the company as well as performance schedules
reflecting labor costs with and without the proposed interim changes.23 In ad-
dition, the president and chief executive officer testified that the company
would not be able to survive for more than a week without the proposed
changes. 2 The union did not dispute this evidence.'25 The court granted the re-
quested relief.'26
These two cases make it clear that a debtor-in-possession seeking interim
changes bears a heavy burden to satisfy the strict REA Express standard. If
the relief is granted, such changes will remain in place only for the time the col-
lective bargaining agreement continues in effect.'27 Thus, such changes will
end when the parties reach a new agreement or the court permits rejection of
the existing agreement.
Unilateral Rejection
Subsection (f) overrules the holding in Bildisco that a debtor-in-possession
may unilaterally terminate the agreement without committing an unfair labor
practice pending court adjudication of a petition to reject the agreement.'28
This subsection uses the language "no provision of this title shall be construed
to permit" unilateral rejection. 29 This removes the conflict on this issue be-
1"9 d. at 745.
1201d.
1 46 Bankr. 247 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
1231d.
J24Id
"
1231d.
1'1d. at 351. The requested relief included reductions in wage rates, elimination of payments to a health and
welfare fund, elimination of payments to a pension fund, elimination of sick leave payments, reduction in
the number of paid holidays, and a reduction in paid vacation.
12711 U.S.C. § 1113(e).
M 104 S. Ct. at 1201.
'"Subsection (f) provides: "No provision of this title shall be construed to permit a trustee to unilaterally ter-
minate or alter any provisions of a collective bargaining agreement prior to compliance with the provisions
of this section."
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tween the NLRA 30 and Chapter 11, and thus a debtor-in-possession who
unilaterally terminates a collective bargaining agreement commits an unfair
labor practice. This provision therefore serves the policy behind section 1113
of encouraging the parties to negotiate changes in the agreement. Subsection
(f) is subject, however, to subsection (d)(2) which permits the debtor-in-
possession to unilaterally reject the agreement if the court fails to rule on an
application to reject within thirty days after the date of the commencement of
the hearing on the application.'3 '
CONSEQUENCES OF REJECTION
The court-approved rejection of a collective bargaining agreement may
carry with it important consequences. In Bildisco, the Supreme Court rules
that the debtor-in-possession is still an "employer" within the meaning of the
NLRA and remains obligated to bargain in good faith under NLRA section
8(a)(5) over the terms and conditions of a new contract.'32 Thus, the debtor-in-
possession who prevails on an application to reject the agreement avoids the
agreement only and not the union itself.
A critical result of rejection of a collective bargaining agreement is that
the employees will have claims against the debtor-in-possession based on rejec-
tion of the agreement. Under section 365(g)(1)' 33 of Chapter 11, rejection of the
agreement constitutes a breach of an executory contract. The breach relates
back to the date immediately preceding the filing of the Chapter I petition.-,
This results in prepetition unsecured claims for the union members for
damages flowing from the breach. '35 Under section 502(g), these claims must be
presented through the normal administration process by which such claims are
estimated and classified.'36 These claims include lost fringe benefits, security
provisions like seniority rights,'37 and specifically vacation, severance, sick
leave pay, and pension plan obligations.'38
"'National Labor Relations Act §8(d), 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (1982).
'I I U.S.C. § I I 13(d)(2).
1'104 S. Ct. at 1201.
"'Section 365(g) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (h)(2) and (i)(2) of this section, the rejection of an executory contract
or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract or lease--... (I) if such contract
or lease has not been assumed under this section or under a plan confirmed under chapter 9, I1, or 13
of this title, immediately before the date of the filing of the petition....
' -Id.
"'38 Bankr. at 504.
'1 I U.S.C. § 502(g).
"1'104 S. Ct. at 1199 n. 12 (citing I I U.S.C. § 502(c). Section 502(c) provides: "There shall be estimated for
purpose of allowance under this section-...
(2) any right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to pay-
ment."
1' ] U.S.C. § 507(a)(3).
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A specific consequence of rejection involves pension plan provisions. If
the agreement includes such a provision, rejection of the agreement may carry
with it as a matter of law withdrawal from the pension plan. 39 This in turn
may give rise to liability under the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974. " '
The unionized employees also retain the right to strike if their collective
bargaining agreement is rejected.' In Briggs Transp. v. Int 7 Bhd. of Teamster,
Etc.,"' the debtor-in-possession was permitted to reject the collective bargain-
ing agreement in effect with the unions. Anticipating a strike in response to
new wage schedules, the company sought a preliminary injunction to prevent
the strike. The company argued that the policy behind the Bankruptcy Code
and the Bildisco decision authorized the court to enjoin the defendants without
regard to the Norris-LaGuardia Act."3 The court held that the dispute was one
arising out of a labor dispute and therefore the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied,
since "the appropriate balance between the competing policies of the
Bankruptcy Code and the Norris LaGuardia Act was struck by Congress when
it enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act and this court is in no position to change
that result."'" Thus, should employees strike after rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement, the debtor-in-possession is limited to traditional
recourse under the labor laws.
CONCLUSION
The conflict in bankruptcy between unionized employees and their
employer may be particularly acute. A company forced to take the drastic step
of fling for reorganization under Chapter 11 will want to reduce all expenses,
including labor costs under a collective bargaining agreement. The union will
want to preserve its members' jobs at a fair level of compensation, while assur-
ing that it is not the only target of the company's cost-cutting efforts.
The unions were rightfully distressed by the Bildisco decision. The
employee rights and benefits guaranteed by a collective bargaining agreement
surely deserve greater protection than being subject to unilateral termination
pending court approval of a petition to reject. In addition, the "balancing of
the equities" test, with its uncertain contours, by itself did not provide ade-
L"ANDESON. CHAPTER I I REORGANIZATIONS § 9.13, at 9-53 (1984).
"Id For additional discussion, see Perkins, Pension Claia in Bankruptcy. 32 LABoR LJ. No. 6 (June 198 1)
p. 343.
,1n re Gray Truck Line Co., 34 Bankr. 174, 179 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983).
140 Bankr. 972 (D.C. Minn.), afT4 739 F.2d 341 (1984).
"129 U.S.C. §§ 101-05 (1976). The Act limits a court's power to issue an injunction. 29 U.S.C.§ 101 states in
part: "No court of the United States, as herein defined, shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in strict conformi-
ty with the provisions of this Act. .. ".
1040 Bankr. at 974.
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quate protection against unwarranted action by the debtor-in-possession.
It is hoped that the procedures established by section 1113 will provide an
equitable and workable solution to this conflict. Congress has responded to the
concerns raised about Bildisco by emphasizing negotiation over unilateral ac-
tion and by requiring greater speed throughout the process.
Clearly there are cases where modifications or terminations of agreements
in bankruptcy may be required to save businesses and jobs. Bildisco Manufac-
turing changed from an insolvent building supply distributorship with eighty
to one hundred unionized employees to a door manufacturer with twelve
nonunion employees.14 Section 1113 recognizes both the long and short-term
problems faced by the debtor-in-possession. A company suffering chronic
financial difficulties will be able to reject or modify the collective bargaining
agreement if the equities clearly balance toward such action. A debtor facing
serious short-term problems can seek interim relief, or can act unilaterally if
the court does not respond to its plea. In this manner, section 1113 serves the
interests of the debtor.
Yet the primary focus of section 1113 concerns the interests of the union
and its members. The union is given opportunities to negotiate changes in the
agreement, to reject a proposal if the union has "good cause" to do so, and to
argue that the equities do not clearly balance in favor of rejection. Cases con-
struing section 1113 seem to understand the congressional concern for the
unions. These cases have placed the burden on the debtor to justify its pro-
posals, and have applied the strict REA Express standard to petitions seeking
interim relief.
Future cases will provide content to the uncertain terms of section 1113.
These cases should focus on the interests of both parties to a collective bargain-
ing agreement. Rejection or modification should be permitted when necessary
to save the business and the employees' jobs. On the other hand, the burden
must not fall exclusively on the unionized employees. The union must also
have the ability to negotiate over such changes. Thus, the phrase "good cause"
should be construed to allow scope for such bargaining. In such a manner, sec-
tion 1113 will serve the needs of all involved in reaching a solution to an often
complex and difficult situation.
PIERCE RICHARDSON
"'N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1984, at D25, col. 1.
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